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Abstract 
Mechanisms for the automation of uncertainty are required for expert systems. 
Sometimes these mechanisms need to obey the properties of probabilistic reason­
ing. A purely numeric mechanism, like those proposed so far, cannot provide a 
probabilistic logic with truth functional connectives. We propose an alternative 
mechanism, Incidence Calculus, which is based on a representation of uncertainty 
using sets of points, which might represent situations, models or possible worlds. 
Incidence Calculus does provide a probabilistic logic with truth functional connec­
tives. 
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1. Introduction 
Several mechanisms have been suggested for the automation of reasoning with 
uncertainty, e.g. Fuzzy Logic, [Zadeh 8 1], Shafer-Dempster theory, [Lowrance � 
Garvey 82], and the mechanisms proposed in MYCIN, [Shortliffe 76] and PROSPECTOR, 
[Duda et at 78]. Most of these mechanisms involve assigning numbers to axioms 
(e.g the facts and rules of an expert system), and assigning arithmetic functions 
to the rules of inference, so that new numbers can be calculated for the 
theorems that are derived from the axioms (e.g. the diagnoses of an expert 
system). We will call such mechanisms, purely numeric. 
We will see that it is a desirable property of any uncertainty mechanism that 
the connectives should be truth functional with respect to the uncertainty 
measures. That is, it should be possible to calculate the uncertainty measure of a 
complex formula solely from the uncertainty measures of its subformulae. Note 
that the Propositional Logic connectives are truth functional with respect to the 
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truth values true and false. 
In some applications it is important to be able to assign meaning to the 
numbers so obtained, rather than use them merely to rank order some options. 
For instance, in medical diagnosis a user sometimes needs to be able to distinguish 
the situations where a diagnosis is very probably correct from the situation 
where it is just the best of an improbable batch. In the first case a surgeon 
might be prepared to perform a dangerous operation, in the second s/he might 
want to call for more tests and a re-diagnosis. In these situations we would like 
the numbers to represent probabilities. 
Unfortunately, the logical connectives cannot be truth functional with respect 
to probabilities, or any other purely numeric uncertainty measure (see [Bundy 84]). 
We will propose a mechanism, called Incidence Calculus, in which the uncertainty 
measures are sets, for which the connectives are truth functional, and from 
which probabilities can easily be calculated. 
2. A Set Theoretic Mechanism 
Incidence Calculus is based on the set-theoretic roots of probability theory. 
We will associate uncertainty values with sentences, i.e. formulae with no free 
variables, in some logic, e.g. Predicate Logic. The probability of a sentence is 
based on a sample space of points, [ Feller 68]. Each point can be regarded as 
a situation, Tarskian interpretation or possible world in which a sentence will be 
either true or false. The sample space is intended to be an exhaustive and 
disjoint set of points. It will be denoted w. 
Non-trivial theories often have an infinite number of possible interpretations. 
For computational reasons we will usually require the sample space to be finite. 
Thus each point must sometimes stand for a, possibly infinite, equivalence class of 
interpretations. 
Let i(A) be the subset of w, containing all those points in which sentence A is 
true. We will call i(A), the incidence* of A. In [Feller 68] what we call an 
incidence is called an event, however, the term event is also used, ambiguously, to 
refer to sentences. The distinction between incidences and sentences is crucial 
in the discussion below, so we will not use the ambiguous term 'event'. 
The dependence or independence of two sentences is coded in the amount of 
intersection between their incidences. The amount of intersection of two 
independent sentences is no more or less than you would expect from a random 
assignment of the elements of their incidences. 
For the rest of this paper we will assume the underlying logic to be Predicate 
Logic. The following axioms of Incidence Calculus associate a set theoretic 
'function with each connective, propositional constant and quanti-fier o-f Predicate 
(Propositional) Logic so that the incidence o-f a complex sentence can be cal­
culated from the incidences o-f its subsentences. We call the resulting system 
Predicate (Propositional) Incidence Logic. 
i(t) 
= w (i) 
*incid�nc�: d�gree, �xtent or frequ�ncy of occurr�nc�; amount. - Collins English Dictionary. 
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where t is universally true sentence 
i(f') = {} 
where f' is universally false sentence 
iCAl = w \ i(A) 
i(A .. B) = i(A) (\ i(B) 
i(A v 8) = i(A) U i(B) 
H'v'X A(X)) .£ i(A(s)) £ i(]X A(X)) 
where s is a term containing no variables 
not bound in A(X) 
Note that there is no independence condition on equations (i) to (v), and 
that all the connectives are truth functional with respect to incidences. 
axioms for the universal and existential quantifiers only set upper and 
bounds, respectively, on their incidences, so the quantifiers are not truth 
tional with respect to incidences. This is not surprising since they are not 
functional with respect to truth values either. 
(i i) 
(iii) 
(ivl 
(v) 
(vi) 
hence 
The 
lower 
func­
truth 
If J is a point, let e_(J) be the probability of J occurring. If I is a set of 
points, let wp(I) be the sum of the probabilities of the points in I, i.e. 
wp(I) = �tl e<Jl 
wp(I) is call�d the weighted probability of I. For computational reasons we will 
usually use finite I, but the theory does not require I to be finite or even 
discrete. 
Since the sample space is meant to be an exhaustive and disjoint set of points, 
we will require that: 
wp(w) = 1 
If A is a sentence, let p(A) be the probability of A occurring. We define 
p(A) = wp(i(A)) 
If A and B are sentences, let p(AIBl be the conditional probability of A given 
B. We define: 
p(AIBl = wp(i(A)n i(B))/wp(i(B)) 
From these definitions it is easy to derive the equations for probability. 
p(t) = 
p(f) = 0 
pC A) = 1 
- p(A) 
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p(A !. B) = p(A).p(B) 
provided A and B are independent 
p(A v B) = p(A) + p(B) - p(A !. B) 
p(A !. B) = p(B).p(AIBl 
3. The Representation of Incidences 
One of the advantages of a purely numeric mechanism for uncertainty is that 
computers are particularly efficient at representing and manipulating numbers. 
They are not so efficient at representing and manipulating sets. 
However, Incidence Calculus can be implemented reasonably efficiently by 
representing the incidences of senten::::es as bit strings and manipulating them 
with logical operations. Each incidence can be represented by a bit string of a 
fixed length, say 1 00 bits, each bit corresponding to an element of w. The longer 
the string, the greater the accuracy, but the greater the cost in terms of 
space and time. Each bit in a string is 1 or 0 according to whether the 
element it corresponds to is or is not in the incidence being represented. 
The incidence of A !. B can then be calculated by taking the logical and of the 
incidences of A and B; the incidence of A v B can be calculated by taking the 
logical or of the incidences of A and B; and the incidence of -A can be 
calculated by taking the logical not of the incidence of A. 
Incidences can be a more efficient method of storing probabilistic information 
than probabilities. Consider the Propositional Incidence Calculus situation and 
suppose that we want to assign the probabilities of a set of sentences. Let 
this set contain n different propositions. If we are to conduct inference with 
these sentences then we may have to add new sentences to the set during 
inference, so we had better consider the set as containing all sentences con­
structable from the n propositions. If 0all sentences are put in conjunctive 
normal form we can see that there are 22 different sentences altogether whose 
probability needs to be stored. However, I am reliably informed* that the 
probabilities of all these sentences can be recovered provided the probabilities of 
all the 2" clauses is known. To store a decimal number of m digits requires 1 O.m 
bits. thus 1 O.m.2" are required altogether. To record a probability of m digits in 
an incidence requires a sample space of size 1 om. i.e. 1 om bits. But the 
incidences (and hence probabilities) of all sentences of the set can be recovered 
from the incidences of the n propositions, so only nx 1 om bits are required 
altogether. In a typical expert system m will be very small compared with n 
(uncertainty measures are usually subjective so a value of m>2 would be spurious 
accuracy, whereas n will have the same order of magnitude as the number of 
production rules), so 1 0m.n « 1 0.m.2°. Therefore, the minimum storage required 
for the incidences is significantly less than that required for probabilities. 
*O.H. Titt�rington, P�raonal Communication. 
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4. Inference Under Uncertainty 
Any calculus for uncertainty reasoning needs to provide some mechanism for 
inheriting uncertainty values from the hypothesis of an inference step to the 
· conclusion, i.e. if we know the uncertainty of A and A->B then we need to be 
able to calculate the uncertainty of B when modus ponens is applied. By analogy 
with the truth functionality of Propositional Logic, we will call this property of a 
calculus, proof functionality. 
However, this proof functional criterion is too strong and must be relaxed in 
general. Consider the case of modus ponens, B may be derivable in several ways, 
e.g. from C and C->8. Any particular derivation can only provide a lower bound 
on the certainty uf B. But we would like to make this lower bound as tight as 
possible, i.e. to make the calculus as proof functional as possible. 
In Incidence Calculus the uncertainty of a sentence is its Incidence. In general, 
if A 1- 8 is a rule of inference of a logical system then all we can infer is that 
i(A} � HBh if A is true in some point then B will be true in that point. Each 
derivation of B provides a new lower bound for its incidence. The greatest 
lower bound is found by taking the union of these lower bounds. This is 
legitimised by the set theoretic theorem, 
where I is the incidence and L1 and L2 two tower bounds. 
The maintenance of a lower bound of the true incidence is in the same spirit 
that MYCIN amalgamates the certainty factors calculated from different deriva­
tions of the same conclusion, except that the MYCIN amalgamation algorithm is 
ad-hoc whereas ours is justified by set theory. 
In some cases inference steps are proof functional, e.g. when deriving A&.B 
from A and B then HA&.Bl=i(A}ni(B). Note that in a probability calculus 
p(A 3. B) "' p(A).p(B) + c(A,B) . .jp(Al.pC A).p(B).p(-8) 
where c(A,B), the correlation between A and B, can vary between -1 and +1, so 
for given p(A) and p(B), p(A3.B) can take a range of values. Thus a probability 
calculus would not be proof functional in this case. We can rephrase this 
observation by saying that in order for an uncertainty mechanism to be proof 
functional for this rule of inference it is necessary that a. be truth functional 
with respect to the uncertainty measure. a. is truth functional with respect to 
incidences but not probabilities. Similar remarks will hold for any rule of in­
ference in which the hypotheses are all subformulae of the conclusion. This 
emphasises the importance of the connectives being truth functional with respect 
to the uncertainty measure. 
In general, the lower bounds provided by Incidence Calculus are much tighter 
than those provided by a purely numeric probability calculus because the connec­
tives are truth functional with respect to incidences but not to probabilities. 
The Rules of Inference of Predicate Calculus preserve truth, i.e. if the 
hypothesis is true in some interpretation then the conclusion is true in that 
interpretation. Thus we might have a rule A a. B 1- A, but not a rule 
A 1- A &. B. However, in an uncertainty calculus, we can extend the notion of 
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rule of inference to include both of these rules: while the first, given i(A!.B), 
provides a new lower bound for i(A), the second, given i(A) provides a new upper 
bound for i(A!.B). If we are only given upper and lower bounds for the 
hypotheses then both rules provide both new upper and new lower bounds for 
their conclusions. 
An inference engine for an Incidence Logic can and should exploit this extended 
notion of rule of inference operating on upper and lower bounds of the 
incidences of the sentences of the logic. The Legal Assignment Finder, described 
in [Bundy 84, Bundy 85], provides such an inference engine for Propositional 
Incidence Logic. It is a extension of the Beth's Semantic Tableau and is shown 
to be complete for Propositional Incidence Logic in [Bundy 85]. 
The Legal Assignment Finder incorporates rules of inference corresponding to 
each of the connectives, for inheriting both upper and lower bounds and going in 
both directions. That these connectives are truth functional with respect to 
incidences is a direct contribution to the proof functionality of the inference 
engine. 
The Legal Assignment Finder is input an initial assignment of upper and lower 
bounds for the incidences of a set of sentences in Propositional Logic. It uses 
rules of inference to specialize this initial assignment to just those legal assign­
ments of incidences to these sentences. Suppose F is an assignment, then it 
d�fines the functions supF and infF from sentences to incidences. The former 
g1ves the upper bound and the latter the lower bound. 
For instance, there is a rule of inference 
And1: 
where assignment G is 
rule is that since 
a specialization of assignment F. The justification of this 
i(A!.B) � supF(A!.B) and 
w\i(B) � w\infF(B) then 
i(A!.B) u w\i(B) � supF(A!.B) u w\infF(B) 
But i(A) � i(A!.B) U w\i(B) 
and i(A) � supF(A) 
The Legal Assignment Finder has 4 such rules for negation and 6 each for 
conjunction, disjunction and implication. 
5. Assigning Incidences 
To initialize an incidence based system, sentences must be given as axioms and 
incidences must be assigned to them. [Bundy 84, Corlett & Todd 85] discusses how 
incidences may be calculated from user assigned probabilities and correlations, if 
available. 
An alternative solution is to assign incidences directly. These incidences might 
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be subjective or objective. Subjective incidences would be estimated by the 
expert or user, just as uncertainty numbers usually are in expert systems. 
Objective incidences would be provided by data from field studies, just as 
objective probabilities are provided in Bayesian decision aids.* The human provider 
of subjective incidences would have to be presented with some sample space, w, 
of incidents from which to chose. In practice, w would have to be small and 
might be presented in some graphic form, e.g. a screen divided up into an 
array. It would help if the incidents were meaningful to the human and related 
to the domain, e.g. days of the week. The Inconsistency Detection Algorithm 
could track the assignment and warn of any inconsistency. Empirical studies are 
required to see whether this is feasible. It is known that humans often object 
to providing uncertainty numbers; would incidences be better or worse? 
The provision of objective incidences involves less statistical analysis than the 
provision of objective probabilities. Each set of identical experiments becomes an 
incident and is stored in the incidence of those formulae that were true in the 
experiments. One does not need to calculate the probability of the formulae, 
but one does need to estimate the probability of the individual incidents. If 
each experiment is considered equi-probable then the probability of each incident 
can be calculated from the number of experiments in its set. One also needs to 
assume that these incidents cover all the cases. 
6. Conclusion and Further Work 
In this note we have described a mechanism, Incidence Calculus·, for incor­
porating probabilistic reasoning in an inference system. This mechanism is based 
on the assignment of sets of points to sentences, rather than the normal 
technique of assigning numbers to sentences. Our mechanism provides a 
probabilistic logic with truth functional connectives. A purely numeric mechanism 
cannot provide this. Because of this property, Incidence Calculus provides tighter 
bounds on the probabilities of inferred sentences than could be provided by such 
a numeric mechanism. 
Incidence Calculus can be implemented reasonably efficiently using bit strings. 
It is then a more efficient technique for storing the probabilities of sentences 
than a purely numeric mechanism, especially if the dependencies between sentences 
must also be stored. 
We have designed and implemented a complete inference engine for Propositional 
Incidence Logic, the Legal Assignment Finder, and outlined the extensions required 
to extend this into an inference engine for Predicate Incidence Logic. More work 
is required to explore the theoretical properties of this extended engine, e.g. 
completeness and soundness, and to implement and test it. 
Incidence Calculus can be readily adapted to Shafer-Dempster Theory, i.e. to 
returning an interval of probabilities rather than a single value. 
Some of the mechanisms described in this paper have been implemented. Fur­
ther implementation and testing is required. 
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